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00:00:02,586 --> 00:00:04,517
It's the first
public demonstration
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00:00:04,586 --> 00:00:07,034
of the world's most
sophisticated passenger jet.
3
00:00:07,103 --> 00:00:10,344
Okay, you have 100 feet there.
100.
4
00:00:10,413 --> 00:00:12,827
The Airbus A320
is being introduced
to the world.
5
00:00:19,241 --> 00:00:22,482
That introduction
turns into a fatal calamity.
Thirty.
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00:00:22,551 --> 00:00:24,137
- It can't be!
- Thirty.
7
00:00:35,413 --> 00:00:39,034
It could not possibly
have come at a worse time
for Airbus.
8
00:00:39,758 --> 00:00:41,931
The crash
was a major embarrassment.
9
00:00:43,379 --> 00:00:45,931
There's enormous pressure
on investigators.
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00:00:47,620 --> 00:00:51,724
If Airbus is to survive,
they must find the answer
to one crucial question:
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00:00:51,793 --> 00:00:55,137
Was it the pilot,
or was it the plane?
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Mayday, mayday.
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00:01:20,931 --> 00:01:25,000
It's 2:30 in the afternoon
on June the 26th, 1988.
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An unusual charter flight
prepares to depart
15
00:01:28,896 --> 00:01:30,586
Basel-Mulhouse Airport
in France,
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00:01:30,655 --> 00:01:32,448
near the Swiss border.
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00:01:35,000 --> 00:01:37,379
Anti-ice.
Captain Michel Asseline
18
00:01:37,448 --> 00:01:40,448
is one of Air France's
most distinguished pilots.
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00:01:40,517 --> 00:01:43,241
On.
Though only 44,
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he's the head of pilot training
for the company's newest plane,
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00:01:47,655 --> 00:01:49,413
the Airbus A320.
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00:01:51,310 --> 00:01:54,827
It's only the third of its kind
to roll off the assembly line.
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Captain Asseline flew
this very aircraft
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from the factory in Toulouse
just two days earlier.
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I was in charge
of the launching of the 320
in Air France.
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The company used me
to promote the aircraft.
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Speeches to make.
I was constantly on the...
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on the television,
on newspaper.
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00:02:11,931 --> 00:02:16,034
- Air Charter, 296,
we'd like to roll, please.
- Air Charter, 296...
30
00:02:16,103 --> 00:02:18,793
Asseline's first officer,
Pierre Mazières,
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00:02:18,862 --> 00:02:22,000
is also a senior
Air France pilot.
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00:02:22,689 --> 00:02:25,068
He's invited
two off-duty flight attendants
33
00:02:25,137 --> 00:02:28,000
to come along for the ride
on this special flight.
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The aircraft is booked
to perform a low-altitude
flyover at a local airshow.
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00:02:34,344 --> 00:02:37,448
There are 130 people
on board this A320...
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00:02:38,689 --> 00:02:41,620
...which is unusual
for an airshow
demonstration flight.
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They have no luggage.
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00:02:45,206 --> 00:02:48,551
For some, it's their first time
on an airplane.
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00:02:50,482 --> 00:02:53,310
There are even children,
like seven-year-old
Mariama Barry,
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00:02:53,379 --> 00:02:55,310
unaccompanied by their parents.
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After the flyover,
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00:02:59,275 --> 00:03:02,689
they will be taken
on a sightseeing tour
around Mont Blanc,
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00:03:02,758 --> 00:03:04,758
the highest peak
in Western Europe.
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00:03:07,275 --> 00:03:11,310
Most got their tickets
as promotional gifts
from a local bank and newspaper.
45
00:03:14,241 --> 00:03:19,137
Jean-Marie Schreiber
is a young reporter covering
the launch of the new plane.
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00:03:22,827 --> 00:03:25,551
As a journalist,
I was thrilled
to be on the flight,
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00:03:25,620 --> 00:03:28,689
to have a chance to see how
people reacted inside the plane.
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00:03:34,034 --> 00:03:37,344
Another journalist aboard,
Jean-Claude Boetsch,
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00:03:37,413 --> 00:03:39,241
has been busy
recording the event.
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As I got on the plane,
I thought: Great,
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00:03:44,206 --> 00:03:48,379
this is going to be
an unforgettable experience,
and it really was unforgettable.
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00:03:52,620 --> 00:03:56,896
The A320
is the first civil aircraft
to use fly-by-wire,
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00:03:56,965 --> 00:04:00,310
a cutting-edge technology that
computerizes flight controls.
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00:04:01,275 --> 00:04:04,241
The system had previously
mainly been used
by the military.
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00:04:06,344 --> 00:04:08,724
On the fly-by-wire system,
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00:04:08,793 --> 00:04:11,931
the pilot essentially flies
the computer,
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00:04:12,000 --> 00:04:13,931
and the computer flies
the aircraft.
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00:04:14,965 --> 00:04:18,793
Fly-by-wire alters
the relationship
between pilot and plane.
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It gives computers the ability
to override human inputs
to prevent pilot error.
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00:04:26,724 --> 00:04:30,724
The A320's flight computer
won't let its human operators
do anything
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00:04:30,793 --> 00:04:32,758
it determines to be dangerous.
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00:04:36,965 --> 00:04:41,275
Airbus has become
the first civil-aircraft maker
to embrace this technology.
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00:04:43,655 --> 00:04:45,413
It hopes
this will give it an edge
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00:04:45,482 --> 00:04:48,482
over its long-time
American rival, Boeing.
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In its first
public presentation,
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00:04:53,034 --> 00:04:54,896
Airbus has a lot on the line.
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00:04:55,793 --> 00:04:58,965
Okay, tell me what you want
in terms of speed and altitude.
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Okay then, takeoff right turn.
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00:05:02,068 --> 00:05:04,379
We go nice and easy
to find our thing.
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00:05:04,448 --> 00:05:07,068
We tried to demonstrate
the capability
of this aircraft.
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00:05:07,793 --> 00:05:10,172
To say we wanted to show off?
Not exactly.
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We wanted to make a good job
and were sure
to make a good job.
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00:05:12,862 --> 00:05:15,827
Once we identify the airfield,
we extend flaps to 3,
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we'll do the flyover at 100,
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00:05:18,758 --> 00:05:21,137
uh... landing gear out.
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00:05:21,206 --> 00:05:24,413
And you just leave it up to me.
I'll give it Alpha Max.
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I've done it 20 times.
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00:05:28,172 --> 00:05:29,689
Okay.
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00:05:29,758 --> 00:05:33,068
Captain Asseline is planning
a breathtaking manoeuvre,
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a low-altitude nose-high fly-by
at Alpha Max.
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This is the slowest a plane
can fly without stalling.
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Ladies and gentlemen,
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00:05:45,241 --> 00:05:48,379
hello and welcome aboard
this Airbus A320,
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00:05:48,448 --> 00:05:51,206
which was put into service
just two days ago.
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00:05:52,241 --> 00:05:54,689
We will be shortly taking off
for a short sightseeing flight,
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00:05:54,758 --> 00:05:58,344
which we'll start
from the Habsheim Flying Club,
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and then we'll be flying
around Mont Blanc.
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I wish you
a very pleasant flight.
89
00:06:05,827 --> 00:06:07,344
That's done.
90
00:06:08,655 --> 00:06:10,931
ACF 296Q clear for takeoff.
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00:06:11,000 --> 00:06:12,517
Runway 16.
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00:06:14,137 --> 00:06:16,482
We're rolling.
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00:06:19,655 --> 00:06:21,275
Takeoff... go.
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00:06:23,275 --> 00:06:24,586
Parameters normal.
95
00:06:26,137 --> 00:06:28,379
100.
96
00:06:28,448 --> 00:06:32,034
It's already requesting climb.
You see that?
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00:06:32,103 --> 00:06:34,310
Yes, that happens.
I know the bug.
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00:06:35,620 --> 00:06:36,965
V1.
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00:06:38,275 --> 00:06:39,689
Rotate.
100
00:06:47,655 --> 00:06:49,379
Gear up. Flaps: 1.
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00:06:53,793 --> 00:06:56,482
After Takeoff checklist
completed.
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00:06:59,448 --> 00:07:01,896
It's only a five-minute flight
to Habsheim Airfield,
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00:07:01,965 --> 00:07:03,586
where the airshow is being held.
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For this sleepy Alsatian town,
the airshow is the highlight
of the summer.
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The airshow drew
more than 5,000 people.
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There was significant interest
from the public.
107
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The airfield is so small,
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its coordinates aren't stored
in the plane's
navigation database,
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00:07:27,379 --> 00:07:29,793
so the pilots must find it
by sight.
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You're at 8 nautical miles.
You'll soon see it.
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There's the highway.
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We leave the highway
to the left, don't we?
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No, to the right
of the highway.
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Uh, it's slightly to the right
of the highway.
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00:07:51,551 --> 00:07:54,379
There's the airfield!
You've got it, have you?
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The pilots have spotted
the airfield late.
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They will have to hurry
to descend
to the planned altitude
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for the flyover at the airshow.
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00:08:04,862 --> 00:08:06,827
A crowd is forming
at the runway.
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Air Charter 296,
good afternoon.
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00:08:12,172 --> 00:08:16,137
Habsheim, hello.
We're coming into view
of the airfield for the flyover.
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Yes, I can see you.
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00:08:18,103 --> 00:08:20,103
You're cleared.
The sky is clear.
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Gear down.
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00:08:25,068 --> 00:08:29,206
Okay, we're going in
for low-altitude,
low-speed flyover,
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00:08:29,275 --> 00:08:30,517
296.
127
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Roger.
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2.
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00:08:33,965 --> 00:08:37,827
Quebec November Hotel,
Habsheim, Fox Echo 984.
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Okay.
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00:08:39,551 --> 00:08:42,241
984. Put in 984.
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00:08:45,689 --> 00:08:47,034
3.
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00:08:47,551 --> 00:08:48,724
3.
134
00:08:50,758 --> 00:08:52,620
That's the airfield.
You confirm?
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00:08:52,689 --> 00:08:54,620
Affirmative.
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00:08:56,517 --> 00:09:00,206
Flight 296 makes a gentle turn
to line up with the runway.
137
00:09:01,655 --> 00:09:04,241
The pilots must now lose
more altitude and speed
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to get into position
for the flyover.
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00:09:06,896 --> 00:09:08,413
200.
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00:09:09,275 --> 00:09:10,448
200.
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00:09:19,620 --> 00:09:22,206
Okay,
you're at 100 feet there.
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00:09:22,275 --> 00:09:25,275
100.
- Watch it, watch it.
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00:09:26,931 --> 00:09:29,689
The aircraft is now
at the planned altitude.
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00:09:30,379 --> 00:09:33,206
For Asseline,
this will be the most delicate
part of the manoeuvre.
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He must keep the plane
in a stable position,
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00:09:36,379 --> 00:09:39,068
with the nose up,
but not too high.
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I looked at the ground and said,
"Look, he's not high enough,"
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00:09:43,931 --> 00:09:47,310
because you could see the grass
right out your window.
149
00:09:48,689 --> 00:09:50,379
Okay, I'm okay there.
150
00:09:51,172 --> 00:09:52,517
Disconnect autothrottle.
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00:09:54,379 --> 00:09:57,482
He disables one of the plane's
safety features
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00:09:57,551 --> 00:10:00,655
so that the computer
won't speed up
the slow-moving plane.
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00:10:01,689 --> 00:10:04,620
Only now,
Captain Asseline sees a danger
154
00:10:04,689 --> 00:10:07,172
that threatens the lives
of everyone on board.
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00:10:11,034 --> 00:10:14,413
The A320's low-speed flyover
at the Habsheim Airfield
156
00:10:14,482 --> 00:10:16,758
is suddenly not going
according to plan.
157
00:10:17,482 --> 00:10:20,724
There's a forest in the path
of Captain Asseline's plane.
158
00:10:20,793 --> 00:10:23,241
30.
- Takeoff, go-around power!
159
00:10:23,310 --> 00:10:26,896
He selects
the highest thrust setting
and pulls back on the controls,
160
00:10:26,965 --> 00:10:28,689
expecting the aircraft
to pull up.
161
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But the plane keeps dropping.
162
00:10:30,482 --> 00:10:32,586
It can't be!
163
00:10:38,344 --> 00:10:43,034
I started to see
through the window
tree branches.
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I was astonished.
165
00:10:45,206 --> 00:10:48,551
You can imagine being
on a trail in a large vehicle,
a bumpy trail,
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00:10:48,620 --> 00:10:52,655
driving at 80 or 100 kph
and you're shaking
from all sides.
167
00:10:52,724 --> 00:10:55,275
It was like that.
I was saying to myself:
168
00:10:55,344 --> 00:10:57,103
The plane has to stay
in one piece,
169
00:10:57,172 --> 00:10:59,896
because if the plane
stays whole, we'll be okay.
170
00:10:59,965 --> 00:11:02,034
If it breaks up, we're done for.
171
00:11:13,172 --> 00:11:16,931
Oh, no. Oh, no.
Oh, no. Oh, no.
172
00:11:17,000 --> 00:11:20,827
Still full of fuel,
the right wing of the jet
is sheared off.
173
00:11:21,310 --> 00:11:23,724
The fuel ignites
immediately on impact.
174
00:11:28,000 --> 00:11:29,482
Oh!
175
00:11:33,344 --> 00:11:34,827
We stopped very quickly.
176
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And on the ground,
I broke my seat.
177
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Just because I was holding
very firmly, I broke my seat,
178
00:11:39,827 --> 00:11:42,482
and I could see a lot of flames
all over.
179
00:11:42,551 --> 00:11:47,586
There was about 20-metre-high
flames around the cockpit,
smoke coming from everywhere.
180
00:11:47,655 --> 00:11:51,068
The first officer
is badly injured.
- And he has a lot of blood.
181
00:11:51,137 --> 00:11:55,034
And even with a full harness,
he hit something
in front of him.
182
00:11:57,448 --> 00:12:00,241
What the hell have you done?
183
00:12:01,275 --> 00:12:04,137
I don't know.
I don't understand.
184
00:12:05,137 --> 00:12:08,586
There was a moment of silence
when the plane finally stopped.
185
00:12:11,034 --> 00:12:13,827
Incredibly, the fuselage
is still in one piece.
186
00:12:14,862 --> 00:12:17,241
Everyone has survived
the impact.
187
00:12:18,931 --> 00:12:20,689
But they're not
out of danger yet.
188
00:12:22,965 --> 00:12:25,448
So I lean to the right
and I see red flames.
189
00:12:25,517 --> 00:12:27,724
The windows were red.
190
00:12:27,793 --> 00:12:29,620
And I think: We held together,
191
00:12:29,689 --> 00:12:31,620
but we're going
to burn to death.
192
00:12:35,000 --> 00:12:36,827
Then we heard somebody say,
193
00:12:36,896 --> 00:12:39,241
"Get out, get out!
There's a fire!"
194
00:12:41,758 --> 00:12:43,620
Evacuate the aircraft!
195
00:12:43,689 --> 00:12:46,379
Hurry! I'll deal with him.
Come on.
196
00:12:47,827 --> 00:12:52,689
Only two exits
can be used for evacuation.
The rest are engulfed in flames.
197
00:12:53,482 --> 00:12:57,034
But thick branches block
one of the doors,
making evacuation difficult.
198
00:13:01,620 --> 00:13:04,931
In the chaos of the cabin,
some passengers struggle
with their seatbelts.
199
00:13:07,620 --> 00:13:11,172
Marie-Francoise Froesch
is one of the last passengers
to leave her seat.
200
00:13:12,793 --> 00:13:15,896
She comes across Mariama Barry,
who's trapped in her seat.
201
00:13:20,172 --> 00:13:23,103
Mariama Barry,
she was seven, eight.
202
00:13:23,172 --> 00:13:25,103
After the accident,
203
00:13:25,172 --> 00:13:29,034
people pushing toward the exit
pushed on the backs
of the seats,
204
00:13:29,103 --> 00:13:33,344
the backs that folded over her,
and then she was trapped
by her seatbelt.
205
00:13:33,413 --> 00:13:35,655
No one saw her.
She was forgotten.
206
00:13:37,413 --> 00:13:40,103
Let me help you.
Let me help you. Oh!
207
00:13:40,172 --> 00:13:42,689
But it's too late.
- We'll be okay.
208
00:13:42,758 --> 00:13:44,275
Both are overcome by smoke
209
00:13:44,344 --> 00:13:46,068
before they can get
off the plane.
210
00:13:50,000 --> 00:13:52,206
In the cockpit,
Captain Asseline struggles
211
00:13:52,275 --> 00:13:55,241
to get his injured first officer
out of the burning aircraft.
212
00:13:57,379 --> 00:13:59,931
I took him from his seat,
unbelt him, carried,
213
00:14:00,000 --> 00:14:02,379
I don't know how,
and I put him on the slide.
214
00:14:04,482 --> 00:14:08,344
When the passengers,
all of them, the last one,
was out of the plane,
215
00:14:08,413 --> 00:14:10,000
I saw my crew.
216
00:14:10,068 --> 00:14:13,172
They told me: "Captain, Captain,
they are all out."
217
00:14:21,620 --> 00:14:23,620
I couldn't believe it.
218
00:14:27,241 --> 00:14:28,896
But the crew is wrong.
219
00:14:28,965 --> 00:14:31,206
Not all the passengers
have made it out.
220
00:14:39,862 --> 00:14:42,137
Marie-Francoise Froesch,
221
00:14:42,206 --> 00:14:45,724
Mariama Barry
and another young boy are dead.
222
00:14:52,689 --> 00:14:55,517
In addition
to the tragic loss of life,
223
00:14:55,586 --> 00:14:58,068
the accident is a PR disaster
for Airbus.
224
00:15:03,241 --> 00:15:08,103
The crash could not possibly
have come at a worse time
for Airbus.
225
00:15:08,172 --> 00:15:11,448
They were trying out
this new concept,
226
00:15:11,517 --> 00:15:14,413
which they had touted
very widely...
227
00:15:14,482 --> 00:15:18,206
as a new level of safety
for civil flight,
228
00:15:18,275 --> 00:15:21,620
and here's a pilot
going and crashing one.
229
00:15:22,758 --> 00:15:25,517
For those who actually saw
the accident,
230
00:15:25,586 --> 00:15:29,758
and it was broadcast
on the news media
throughout the world
231
00:15:29,827 --> 00:15:32,034
the same evening
that it happened,
232
00:15:32,103 --> 00:15:33,620
there was amazement.
233
00:15:33,689 --> 00:15:35,896
Oh, no. Oh, no. Oh, no.
234
00:15:35,965 --> 00:15:38,931
The crash
was a major embarrassment.
235
00:15:45,310 --> 00:15:48,551
Investigators from France's
Accident Investigation Bureau
236
00:15:48,620 --> 00:15:50,896
are on the scene of the crash
within hours.
237
00:15:52,758 --> 00:15:56,344
They need to know
why this demonstration flight
ended in disaster.
238
00:15:59,275 --> 00:16:02,000
They recover the plane's
data and voice recorders.
239
00:16:07,862 --> 00:16:10,379
Claude Bechet will head
the investigation.
240
00:16:10,448 --> 00:16:13,896
Was it the pilot,
or was it the plane?
241
00:16:14,172 --> 00:16:15,655
We need to know.
242
00:16:15,724 --> 00:16:17,931
Like the pilots of Flight 296,
243
00:16:18,000 --> 00:16:20,965
he also works for Air France
as an airline captain...
244
00:16:21,034 --> 00:16:24,551
- Let's get to work.
- ...which is unusual
for a state investigator.
245
00:16:26,034 --> 00:16:28,206
At that time,
I was still, uh...
246
00:16:28,275 --> 00:16:30,206
an airline pilot.
247
00:16:30,275 --> 00:16:32,931
And I was in New York
when the accident happened,
248
00:16:33,000 --> 00:16:36,310
and they sent me
a telegram to...
249
00:16:36,965 --> 00:16:39,827
,,,ask me to come back to Paris
as soon as possible.
250
00:16:42,068 --> 00:16:43,689
Apart from the flight recorders,
251
00:16:43,758 --> 00:16:47,000
investigators have
a remarkable piece of evidence
to consider.
252
00:16:48,620 --> 00:16:52,689
A high-quality video
of the accident has been
recorded by a French cameraman.
253
00:16:53,758 --> 00:16:58,206
It was the first time
we had a video of an accident,
you know.
254
00:16:58,275 --> 00:17:00,896
Normally, an accident happens...
255
00:17:00,965 --> 00:17:02,827
in the middle of nowhere.
256
00:17:03,620 --> 00:17:06,172
Nobody is there
with a camera to film it.
257
00:17:07,206 --> 00:17:10,206
The tape clearly shows the plane
flying right at the trees
258
00:17:10,275 --> 00:17:11,793
at the end of the runway.
259
00:17:12,517 --> 00:17:14,517
It doesn't seem
to be climbing at all.
260
00:17:19,827 --> 00:17:22,896
The cockpit voice recorder
offers a confounding clue.
261
00:17:28,275 --> 00:17:30,275
Takeoff, go-around power!
262
00:17:30,896 --> 00:17:32,689
30.
263
00:17:32,758 --> 00:17:34,275
30.
264
00:17:34,344 --> 00:17:35,827
It can't be!
265
00:17:40,000 --> 00:17:41,551
It's clear.
266
00:17:41,620 --> 00:17:45,068
The crew had no idea
there was an obstacle
at the end of the runway.
267
00:17:45,827 --> 00:17:47,689
Investigators are puzzled.
268
00:17:47,758 --> 00:17:50,689
How could a forest
take a pilot by surprise?
269
00:17:56,758 --> 00:18:01,310
Bechet brings Captain Asseline
in for questioning
about the flyover at Habsheim.
270
00:18:02,724 --> 00:18:04,689
They need to know
what his plan was.
271
00:18:04,758 --> 00:18:09,448
My intention was to carry out
a flyover at slow speed.
272
00:18:09,517 --> 00:18:11,862
As a qualified A320 pilot,
273
00:18:11,931 --> 00:18:14,931
Claude Bechet is familiar
with the plane's capabilities.
274
00:18:15,000 --> 00:18:17,620
...over the airstrip
and we go to Alpha Max.
275
00:18:17,689 --> 00:18:19,206
Very good.
276
00:18:19,275 --> 00:18:22,413
He sees nothing wrong
with Captain Asseline's plan.
277
00:18:22,482 --> 00:18:24,034
It was not bad.
278
00:18:24,103 --> 00:18:26,965
Making a slow pass
was well-planned.
279
00:18:27,034 --> 00:18:30,413
And he seemed to me
to be very...
280
00:18:30,482 --> 00:18:32,310
open...
281
00:18:32,379 --> 00:18:35,689
and ready to help to work...
282
00:18:35,758 --> 00:18:37,965
with the investigation
commission.
283
00:18:39,758 --> 00:18:41,413
Investigators turn their attention
284
00:18:41,482 --> 00:18:44,689
to how Air France prepared
the flight crew for the airshow.
285
00:18:46,586 --> 00:18:49,482
They discover a memo
setting out the rules
for all airshow flights.
286
00:18:51,862 --> 00:18:54,034
What draws the attention
of investigators
287
00:18:54,103 --> 00:18:58,586
is the minimum altitude
Air France had selected
for airshow flyovers:
288
00:18:58,655 --> 00:19:00,275
100 feet.
289
00:19:02,310 --> 00:19:04,586
It was in violation
of national regulations.
290
00:19:06,137 --> 00:19:08,517
He should have been
at 500 feet,
as a matter of fact.
291
00:19:09,482 --> 00:19:11,793
But there had, at the time,
292
00:19:11,862 --> 00:19:15,103
a tendency for pilots
who were...
293
00:19:15,172 --> 00:19:17,551
making airshows like that
294
00:19:17,620 --> 00:19:21,206
to go a little bit lower
and sometimes much lower.
295
00:19:21,827 --> 00:19:24,172
Chief investigator Claude Bechet
now wonders
296
00:19:24,241 --> 00:19:27,137
if there were any other mistakes
in the planning of the flight.
297
00:19:32,482 --> 00:19:35,551
He soon learns that Air France's
flight division didn't start
298
00:19:35,620 --> 00:19:38,034
drawing up a flight plan
for the demonstration
299
00:19:38,103 --> 00:19:40,793
until less than 48 hours
before the airshow.
300
00:19:41,620 --> 00:19:44,586
An Air France employee
had prepared maps
of the airfield
301
00:19:44,655 --> 00:19:46,620
for the crew of Flight 296.
302
00:19:50,310 --> 00:19:52,724
Investigators find
a serious problem.
303
00:19:54,379 --> 00:19:56,517
The forest
around Habsheim Airfield
304
00:19:56,586 --> 00:19:58,724
did not show up
on the photocopies.
305
00:20:04,551 --> 00:20:06,896
The employee
who had put together
the flight package
306
00:20:06,965 --> 00:20:09,586
didn't have an opportunity
to discuss it with the crew.
307
00:20:10,310 --> 00:20:12,034
You were using
a navigation chart?
308
00:20:12,103 --> 00:20:14,344
While questioning Asseline,
309
00:20:14,413 --> 00:20:18,172
Bechet discovers that the pilots
were also given little time
to prepare.
310
00:20:18,241 --> 00:20:20,517
- Here's the flight package.
- Thanks.
311
00:20:20,586 --> 00:20:23,000
That's highly unusual
for an airshow.
312
00:20:26,344 --> 00:20:30,448
My co-pilot told me:
"Okay, we make a flight
around Mont Blanc,
313
00:20:30,517 --> 00:20:33,827
and then we have
to make two low pass
over a small airport,
314
00:20:33,896 --> 00:20:35,344
Habsheim.
315
00:20:35,413 --> 00:20:36,965
Told me
there is nothing special.
316
00:20:37,034 --> 00:20:39,241
So for me,
it was a normal flight,
a normal day.
317
00:20:41,206 --> 00:20:44,137
The preparation
had not been complete,
318
00:20:44,206 --> 00:20:48,517
and there had been no briefing
of the crew by the staff.
319
00:20:51,965 --> 00:20:55,620
Investigators then make an intriguing
discovery at the crash site.
320
00:20:58,827 --> 00:21:02,275
They measure the height
of the trees hit by Flight 296.
321
00:21:04,655 --> 00:21:08,862
They discover
the average height of the forest
to be only 40 feet.
322
00:21:11,793 --> 00:21:13,896
This poses an urgent question.
323
00:21:17,482 --> 00:21:21,241
How could an Airbus
that was supposed to be flying
at 100 feet
324
00:21:21,310 --> 00:21:24,068
hit trees
less than half that height?
325
00:21:31,275 --> 00:21:37,137
It is clear to investigators
that Flight 296 fatally deviated
from its original flight plan,
326
00:21:37,206 --> 00:21:40,068
losing altitude
before plunging into a forest.
327
00:21:41,655 --> 00:21:46,206
But only the black-box data
can help them understand
how and why this had happened.
328
00:21:47,965 --> 00:21:50,827
Information from the A320's
flight data recorder
329
00:21:50,896 --> 00:21:53,206
is recovered within hours
of the crash.
330
00:21:54,344 --> 00:21:58,103
The device records information
about 200 aircraft functions.
331
00:22:00,172 --> 00:22:04,206
It paints a detailed picture
of how Flight 296 was operating
332
00:22:04,275 --> 00:22:06,482
in the final minutes
of its journey.
333
00:22:08,103 --> 00:22:10,034
It can't be!
334
00:22:10,275 --> 00:22:12,965
We could reconstruct...
335
00:22:13,034 --> 00:22:15,275
the entire accident.
336
00:22:15,344 --> 00:22:17,655
We could live with the crew...
337
00:22:19,586 --> 00:22:21,793
...as the accident
was happening.
338
00:22:28,103 --> 00:22:31,896
Investigators make
two striking observations
from the data.
339
00:22:34,379 --> 00:22:38,275
The first
is that Flight 296 suffered
no mechanical breakdowns.
340
00:22:40,275 --> 00:22:43,965
The second is that the A320
followed a very different
flight path
341
00:22:44,034 --> 00:22:46,172
than the one
Captain Asseline had planned.
342
00:22:49,000 --> 00:22:52,586
Instead of maintaining
a stable airspeed and altitude,
343
00:22:52,655 --> 00:22:57,448
Flight 296 had slowed down
and lost altitude
as it performed the flyover.
344
00:22:59,931 --> 00:23:02,586
As the A320 crossed
the Habsheim Airfield,
345
00:23:02,655 --> 00:23:05,896
its speed dropped
to only 112 knots.
346
00:23:06,620 --> 00:23:09,379
That's about as slow
as an A320 can fly.
347
00:23:13,689 --> 00:23:16,206
The plane's deceleration
was so dramatic,
348
00:23:16,275 --> 00:23:18,137
it was even visible
on the video.
349
00:23:19,344 --> 00:23:22,758
Michel Asseline was one
of Air France's top pilots.
350
00:23:25,172 --> 00:23:28,758
Claude Bechet is hard-pressed
to understand
351
00:23:28,827 --> 00:23:31,655
how he could've mishandled
such a high-profile flight.
352
00:23:32,965 --> 00:23:36,275
Pressed further,
Asseline explains
how the trouble started.
353
00:23:37,241 --> 00:23:39,310
- You were using
a navigation chart?
- Yes.
354
00:23:39,379 --> 00:23:41,655
We had some difficulty
locating the airfield.
355
00:23:45,000 --> 00:23:47,551
We leave the highway
to the left, don't we?
356
00:23:47,620 --> 00:23:49,724
No, to the right of the highway.
357
00:23:49,793 --> 00:23:52,551
Uh, it's slightly to the right
of the highway.
358
00:23:52,620 --> 00:23:55,103
There's the airfield.
You've got it, have you?
359
00:23:55,862 --> 00:23:58,586
They spotted the airfield
too late.
360
00:23:59,310 --> 00:24:00,965
So when they did,
361
00:24:01,034 --> 00:24:03,965
they reduced the power
and they descended.
362
00:24:04,034 --> 00:24:07,379
So they rushed their descent
in order to get into position
363
00:24:07,448 --> 00:24:09,000
for the flyover.
364
00:24:09,965 --> 00:24:12,206
And they were still
slowing down
365
00:24:12,275 --> 00:24:13,827
when they reached the airfield.
366
00:24:15,137 --> 00:24:17,344
That's the airfield.
You confirm?
367
00:24:17,413 --> 00:24:18,896
Affirmative.
368
00:24:19,586 --> 00:24:22,172
But then,
another problem emerged.
369
00:24:23,827 --> 00:24:26,310
The spectators were lined up
on a different runway
370
00:24:26,379 --> 00:24:28,517
from the one
the crew was heading for.
371
00:24:29,517 --> 00:24:31,965
The crew
of Air France Flight 296
372
00:24:32,034 --> 00:24:34,275
is ill-prepared
for their demonstration flight.
373
00:24:34,344 --> 00:24:36,034
In planning for the airshow,
374
00:24:36,103 --> 00:24:40,103
Air France only provided
the crew with information
for runway 2,
375
00:24:40,172 --> 00:24:42,586
Habsheim's only paved airstrip.
376
00:24:42,655 --> 00:24:45,172
But Captain Asseline sees
the crowds aligned
377
00:24:45,241 --> 00:24:48,068
on a much shorter,
adjacent grass field.
378
00:24:50,310 --> 00:24:52,000
I was expecting
a normal runway.
379
00:24:52,068 --> 00:24:55,137
And at the last moment, I saw
that it was a grass runway.
380
00:24:55,724 --> 00:24:58,758
Captain Asseline
lined up with the grass strip.
381
00:24:59,310 --> 00:25:02,000
I had no idea that at the end
of the runway was a forest.
382
00:25:02,068 --> 00:25:04,000
For me it was bushes only,
or something.
383
00:25:05,620 --> 00:25:07,827
Okay,
you're at 100 feet there.
384
00:25:07,896 --> 00:25:10,827
100.
- Watch it, watch it.
385
00:25:10,896 --> 00:25:13,137
Because they had to rush
their descent,
386
00:25:13,206 --> 00:25:17,206
by the time Flight 296
got to the airfield,
it was flying too fast.
387
00:25:18,034 --> 00:25:22,793
To lose speed,
Captain Asseline kept the thrust
on its lowest power setting,
388
00:25:22,862 --> 00:25:26,965
well below the setting
pilots normally use
for Alpha Max flight.
389
00:25:29,241 --> 00:25:31,482
But another serious problem
was developing.
390
00:25:32,448 --> 00:25:36,344
The aircraft had dropped
below 100 feet
and was continuing to fall.
391
00:25:37,344 --> 00:25:39,586
And the crew
didn't seem to notice.
392
00:25:39,655 --> 00:25:41,931
50.
- I'm okay there.
393
00:25:42,000 --> 00:25:44,862
Disconnect autothrottle.
In a matter of seconds,
394
00:25:44,931 --> 00:25:47,413
the altitude had fallen
to only 30 feet.
395
00:25:49,827 --> 00:25:51,655
What was extremely clear...
396
00:25:51,724 --> 00:25:55,068
is that airplane was flying...
397
00:25:55,137 --> 00:25:59,241
at approximately 30 feet...
above the ground.
398
00:26:00,551 --> 00:26:02,137
Regardless of any other data,
399
00:26:02,206 --> 00:26:04,551
this data
was extremely important.
400
00:26:04,620 --> 00:26:06,413
Takeoff, go-around power!
401
00:26:06,482 --> 00:26:09,103
No airplane of that size,
402
00:26:09,172 --> 00:26:10,724
or of any other size,
403
00:26:10,793 --> 00:26:12,965
should make a flight pass
that low.
404
00:26:15,793 --> 00:26:19,344
The data is clear.
You were 30 feet, not 100.
405
00:26:20,344 --> 00:26:22,793
I believed I was at 100 feet.
406
00:26:22,862 --> 00:26:25,137
Claude Bechet
is still uncertain
407
00:26:25,206 --> 00:26:29,034
how the A320 ended up
so dangerously close
to the ground.
408
00:26:29,862 --> 00:26:32,896
Captain Asseline insists
his instruments failed him.
409
00:26:32,965 --> 00:26:34,137
2.
410
00:26:34,206 --> 00:26:38,551
Quebec November Hotel,
Habsheim, Fox Echo 984.
411
00:26:38,620 --> 00:26:40,517
Okay, 984.
412
00:26:40,586 --> 00:26:43,724
Captain Asseline was relying
on his barometric altimeter.
413
00:26:44,655 --> 00:26:48,000
It uses air pressure
to measure the plane's distance
from the ground.
414
00:26:49,379 --> 00:26:52,862
It had to be set
to local atmospheric pressure
to be accurate.
415
00:26:54,620 --> 00:26:58,206
Quebec November Hotel,
Habsheim, Fox Echo 984.
416
00:26:59,310 --> 00:27:02,206
Okay, 984. Put in 984.
417
00:27:02,275 --> 00:27:05,793
The cockpit recorder
proves that the tower provided
the pressure reading,
418
00:27:05,862 --> 00:27:07,655
and the crew
set their instrument.
419
00:27:09,827 --> 00:27:13,448
But Asseline insists
the altimeter was giving him
a false reading.
420
00:27:14,344 --> 00:27:19,172
I tell you, the altimeter
said the plane was at 100 feet!
421
00:27:20,379 --> 00:27:22,793
Michel Asseline stated...
422
00:27:22,862 --> 00:27:26,965
that the barometric altimeter
was in fact,
423
00:27:27,034 --> 00:27:29,862
to be precise, 67 feet out.
424
00:27:29,931 --> 00:27:32,896
And that is something
that he claims...
425
00:27:32,965 --> 00:27:38,275
uh, led him to be flying
at 30 feet instead of 100 feet.
426
00:27:40,000 --> 00:27:41,827
Investigators are skeptical.
427
00:27:41,896 --> 00:27:46,000
Asseline had more
than one instrument to give him
altitude information.
428
00:27:47,827 --> 00:27:51,482
The A320 has a second altimeter
that uses radio waves
429
00:27:51,551 --> 00:27:54,000
to calculate the plane's
distance from the ground.
430
00:27:57,103 --> 00:27:59,965
That altimeter displays
the altitude
on a digital display.
431
00:28:01,034 --> 00:28:03,758
But Captain Asseline claims
it was difficult to read.
432
00:28:04,517 --> 00:28:07,931
We could not use
the radio altimeter,
433
00:28:08,000 --> 00:28:09,793
because this radio altimeter
is digital,
434
00:28:09,862 --> 00:28:12,413
and nobody can fly
by reading numbers.
435
00:28:12,482 --> 00:28:15,793
I try that later,
in a simulator;
I never succeed to do it.
436
00:28:15,862 --> 00:28:19,241
But the radio altimeter has
another way of alerting pilots.
437
00:28:19,310 --> 00:28:21,310
I'm okay there.
50.
438
00:28:21,379 --> 00:28:23,000
A digital-voice callout.
439
00:28:23,068 --> 00:28:25,000
Disconnect autothrottle.
50.
440
00:28:25,068 --> 00:28:27,379
But Asseline claims
he and his first officer,
441
00:28:27,448 --> 00:28:29,482
Pierre Mazières,
could not hear it.
442
00:28:30,206 --> 00:28:33,827
Some people said,
"But you could've heard
the radio altimeter saying:
443
00:28:33,896 --> 00:28:36,275
'30, 30, 50, 40, 30.' "
444
00:28:36,344 --> 00:28:40,068
No, because at that time,
this aircraft
was very, very noisy.
445
00:28:40,965 --> 00:28:44,482
And we have the headsets.
And we have demonstrated,
at that time,
446
00:28:44,551 --> 00:28:47,965
that the radio-altimeter
warnings, the callouts,
447
00:28:48,034 --> 00:28:50,551
they were not going
through the headset.
448
00:28:51,137 --> 00:28:53,275
Despite Asseline's defence,
449
00:28:53,344 --> 00:28:59,206
investigators are certain
that the crew of Flight 296
mishandled a risky manoeuvre.
450
00:28:59,275 --> 00:29:02,482
Bechet has more questions
for Captain Asseline.
451
00:29:03,758 --> 00:29:05,862
What did you do
when you saw the trees?
452
00:29:08,034 --> 00:29:11,620
I did what any pilot would do.
I tried to climb over them.
453
00:29:11,689 --> 00:29:15,103
Investigators learn
that in the final moments
before the crash...
454
00:29:15,172 --> 00:29:17,000
Takeoff, go-around power!
455
00:29:17,068 --> 00:29:19,862
...Captain Asseline applied
full throttle.
456
00:29:21,551 --> 00:29:25,137
It was when I was waiting
for the engine to spool up
457
00:29:25,206 --> 00:29:27,620
that I realized
in front of me there were trees.
458
00:29:28,586 --> 00:29:30,793
Then I was waiting,
waiting, waiting, waiting.
459
00:29:30,862 --> 00:29:33,310
But he claims
the engines did not respond.
460
00:29:35,103 --> 00:29:38,344
And when they finally kicked in,
it was too late.
461
00:29:40,206 --> 00:29:44,000
I tell you!
The engines did not come on
when I gave it full throttle!
462
00:29:44,586 --> 00:29:48,034
Captain Asseline's testimony
raises a troubling prospect.
463
00:29:49,551 --> 00:29:52,379
If there was a prolonged delay
in engine response,
464
00:29:52,448 --> 00:29:56,517
it could indicate
a critical problem
with the A320's turbojets.
465
00:30:03,448 --> 00:30:07,517
Captain Asseline is convinced
the engines didn't respond
quickly enough
466
00:30:07,586 --> 00:30:10,000
in the final seconds
of the flight.
467
00:30:11,275 --> 00:30:13,206
He makes it his mission
to prove it.
468
00:30:15,103 --> 00:30:19,241
He uncovers an Airbus document
warning of a defect on the A320.
469
00:30:21,344 --> 00:30:25,448
It says the plane's engine speed
could stagnate at low altitude,
470
00:30:25,517 --> 00:30:28,172
a condition caused
by poor airflow.
471
00:30:29,310 --> 00:30:31,862
When this occurs,
the engine cannot accelerate.
472
00:30:35,827 --> 00:30:38,344
But investigators can find
no evidence of such a failure
473
00:30:38,413 --> 00:30:40,551
in any of the data
from the plane.
474
00:30:43,413 --> 00:30:45,310
30.
- Takeoff, go-around power!
475
00:30:45,379 --> 00:30:50,344
In the five seconds
after Captain Asseline applied
full power on the thrust levers,
476
00:30:50,413 --> 00:30:53,586
the A320's twin engines
had begun to spool up.
477
00:30:53,655 --> 00:30:56,000
They reached 84% thrust...
478
00:30:57,310 --> 00:30:58,862
...close to full power,
479
00:30:58,931 --> 00:31:01,034
just before the plane
hit the trees.
480
00:31:01,862 --> 00:31:05,034
When you put from idle
to full power...
481
00:31:05,896 --> 00:31:08,413
...you have the impression
that nothing happens...
482
00:31:08,482 --> 00:31:11,000
...for a few seconds, you know,
483
00:31:11,068 --> 00:31:12,793
and then the power comes.
484
00:31:12,862 --> 00:31:14,344
That was normal,
485
00:31:14,413 --> 00:31:17,275
exactly as predicted
by the certification.
486
00:31:17,827 --> 00:31:22,793
Investigators are
increasingly certain the engines
on Flight 296 didn't fail.
487
00:31:24,344 --> 00:31:26,758
They find a novel way
to verify the data.
488
00:31:28,275 --> 00:31:31,000
Video of the crash picked up
the distinctive sound
489
00:31:31,068 --> 00:31:33,137
of the A320's engines
accelerating.
490
00:31:44,931 --> 00:31:46,586
By studying that sound,
491
00:31:46,655 --> 00:31:50,241
engineers can determine
how much power the engines
were generating
492
00:31:50,310 --> 00:31:52,482
in the final seconds
before the crash.
493
00:31:53,931 --> 00:31:57,344
We were able to compare
the RPM of the engines
494
00:31:57,413 --> 00:31:59,482
from that film...
495
00:31:59,551 --> 00:32:02,275
and from
the flight-data recorder.
496
00:32:03,448 --> 00:32:07,103
There was nothing wrong
with the engines,
any of the two engines.
497
00:32:07,172 --> 00:32:08,655
Why? Why?
498
00:32:08,724 --> 00:32:11,241
Chief investigator Claude Bechet
has a new headache.
499
00:32:12,758 --> 00:32:16,482
Captain Asseline is convinced
there is a conspiracy
against him.
500
00:32:16,551 --> 00:32:19,137
He cuts off all cooperation
with the investigation.
501
00:32:19,206 --> 00:32:21,310
- Very well.
- The investigation committee,
502
00:32:21,379 --> 00:32:24,310
I tried to cooperate with them,
but I began to be suspicious.
503
00:32:24,379 --> 00:32:26,758
In the press each week,
the aircraft is good,
504
00:32:26,827 --> 00:32:30,344
the aircraft has nothing,
pilot error, pilot error,
pilot error.
505
00:32:31,344 --> 00:32:34,137
All that was a big, big,
big cover-up. My opinion.
506
00:32:36,448 --> 00:32:40,413
Captain Asseline
begins a campaign to challenge
the French investigation.
507
00:32:42,620 --> 00:32:45,724
He appears on British television
to make a dramatic assertion.
508
00:32:46,931 --> 00:32:49,724
When I pull the stick
to up position,
509
00:32:49,793 --> 00:32:52,965
the flight controls,
the limiter control
go to down position.
510
00:32:53,551 --> 00:32:56,241
So on any aircraft,
if you ask up...
511
00:32:56,965 --> 00:33:00,620
...following the order
of the pilots,
the limiter control goes to up.
512
00:33:00,689 --> 00:33:03,034
And on that one,
it went to down.
513
00:33:03,103 --> 00:33:05,862
Why?
That will be the good question.
514
00:33:06,620 --> 00:33:10,862
His accusations go to the heart
of doubts about the aircraft:
515
00:33:10,931 --> 00:33:16,517
That Airbus fly-by-wire system
had given the A320's computers
too much control.
516
00:33:21,413 --> 00:33:25,137
Asseline's claim that the plane
didn't follow his instructions
517
00:33:25,206 --> 00:33:28,241
is supported by data
from the plane's
flight recorder.
518
00:33:29,275 --> 00:33:31,448
The black box recorded
every movement
519
00:33:31,517 --> 00:33:33,586
of the pilot's
sidestick controller.
520
00:33:35,068 --> 00:33:37,275
It does show
that seconds before the crash,
521
00:33:37,344 --> 00:33:40,724
Captain Asseline pulled it back
to get the plane's nose up.
522
00:33:41,448 --> 00:33:44,586
Investigators compare it
with what the plane did
in response.
523
00:33:45,413 --> 00:33:47,344
They make
a perplexing discovery.
524
00:33:47,413 --> 00:33:50,344
He's telling the truth.
The elevator moved down.
525
00:33:51,344 --> 00:33:53,793
In the final seconds
before the accident,
526
00:33:53,862 --> 00:33:56,586
the pilots had desperately tried
to pull up.
527
00:33:57,896 --> 00:34:00,448
The sidestick controls
the plane's elevator.
528
00:34:00,517 --> 00:34:04,482
Pulling back on it
should raise the elevator
and pitch the plane upwards.
529
00:34:05,620 --> 00:34:07,379
30.
530
00:34:07,448 --> 00:34:10,103
But that's not what happened
on this flight.
531
00:34:11,655 --> 00:34:14,310
One of the strange things
about the crash flight,
532
00:34:14,379 --> 00:34:16,896
which became apparent
when the...
533
00:34:16,965 --> 00:34:20,689
digital flight recorder
was, uh, analyzed...
534
00:34:21,413 --> 00:34:26,103
...was that during
the last few seconds
prior to contact with the trees,
535
00:34:26,172 --> 00:34:31,206
the pilot was dragging back
on the stick
as hard as he could,
536
00:34:31,275 --> 00:34:33,172
but the...
537
00:34:33,241 --> 00:34:37,724
flight surfaces
were moving into a position
to put the nose down.
538
00:34:38,413 --> 00:34:41,034
Captain Asseline believes
the plane's descent
539
00:34:41,103 --> 00:34:44,000
triggered an automatic response
by the flight computers.
540
00:34:45,689 --> 00:34:49,586
Asseline inadvertently brought
his plane to within 30 feet
of the ground
541
00:34:49,655 --> 00:34:52,655
with his landing gear down
and his flaps extended.
542
00:34:53,655 --> 00:34:56,793
Investigators now wonder
if the plane's computer
determined
543
00:34:56,862 --> 00:34:58,586
that Asseline was landing
544
00:34:58,655 --> 00:35:02,000
and initiated the necessary
steps to accomplish that.
545
00:35:02,068 --> 00:35:06,310
As the plane levelled up
with the airfield,
546
00:35:06,379 --> 00:35:09,896
it overflew a little copse
of trees,
547
00:35:09,965 --> 00:35:13,413
which took the radar altitude
548
00:35:13,482 --> 00:35:16,068
momentarily below 30 feet.
549
00:35:16,137 --> 00:35:17,586
That would've been sufficient
550
00:35:17,655 --> 00:35:22,000
to trigger
the flight-control system
to enter landing mode.
551
00:35:24,724 --> 00:35:26,241
It's possible that,
552
00:35:26,310 --> 00:35:29,689
in spite of what
Captain Asseline was commanding
the plane to do,
553
00:35:29,758 --> 00:35:32,758
the computer brought the plane's
nose down for landing.
554
00:35:37,724 --> 00:35:39,724
Investigators must try
to determine
555
00:35:39,793 --> 00:35:44,172
whether the A320 overrode
its pilot at a critical moment.
556
00:35:48,206 --> 00:35:50,482
They analyze the data
from the flight recorder.
557
00:35:56,137 --> 00:35:58,068
Stop it there.
558
00:35:58,137 --> 00:35:59,965
But to their disappointment...
559
00:36:00,034 --> 00:36:02,517
So was the plane
in landing mode, or not?
560
00:36:02,586 --> 00:36:06,620
...the flight-data recorder
can't confirm if the plane
went into landing mode.
561
00:36:08,275 --> 00:36:10,965
The A320's systems
are so advanced
562
00:36:11,034 --> 00:36:14,172
that the recorder can't track
all of the plane's functions.
563
00:36:15,931 --> 00:36:19,655
Investigator Claude Bechet
comes up with another way
to find out.
564
00:36:22,344 --> 00:36:26,206
He replicates
Asseline's approach
to the Habsheim Airfield
565
00:36:26,275 --> 00:36:28,344
to see how the A320 responds.
566
00:36:28,931 --> 00:36:31,344
Okay, let's start the descent.
567
00:36:32,379 --> 00:36:33,896
Power to flight idle.
568
00:36:37,068 --> 00:36:39,758
Now put it into Alpha Max.
569
00:36:41,000 --> 00:36:42,586
That's it. Gently.
570
00:36:45,482 --> 00:36:47,793
I replayed the accident,
571
00:36:47,862 --> 00:36:50,310
but on the long...
572
00:36:50,379 --> 00:36:52,896
longest runway in Toulouse.
573
00:36:54,206 --> 00:36:55,896
40 feet.
574
00:36:56,655 --> 00:36:58,241
Thirty-five feet.
575
00:36:58,310 --> 00:37:01,655
We replayed the accident
exactly what it was.
576
00:37:01,724 --> 00:37:04,586
Bechet's plan
is to descend to 30 feet,
577
00:37:04,655 --> 00:37:06,758
as Asseline's A320 did.
578
00:37:07,931 --> 00:37:10,172
Now pull up slightly
to level off.
579
00:37:11,448 --> 00:37:12,827
Hold it there.
580
00:37:18,862 --> 00:37:23,172
Bechet wants to see
if the flight computer
puts the plane in landing mode.
581
00:37:23,931 --> 00:37:25,482
Okay, now full thrust.
582
00:37:30,586 --> 00:37:32,103
Did you feel that?
583
00:37:33,793 --> 00:37:35,310
Alpha protection.
584
00:37:35,379 --> 00:37:37,758
The test flight has triggered
a nose-down response
585
00:37:37,827 --> 00:37:39,793
from the plane's computers,
586
00:37:39,862 --> 00:37:41,965
like the crash of Flight 296.
587
00:37:46,517 --> 00:37:48,793
But the plane hadn't gone
into landing mode.
588
00:37:48,862 --> 00:37:50,896
Instead,
the flyover had activated
589
00:37:50,965 --> 00:37:53,586
one of the A320's
main safety features:
590
00:37:54,758 --> 00:37:56,344
Stall protection.
591
00:37:56,862 --> 00:37:59,517
Due to a lack of airflow
over the wings,
592
00:37:59,586 --> 00:38:04,137
flying slowly
in a nose-high position
can cause a plane to lose lift.
593
00:38:05,241 --> 00:38:07,586
The A320's computer
has been programmed
594
00:38:07,655 --> 00:38:10,862
to bring the plane's nose down
when it gets close to stalling.
595
00:38:12,068 --> 00:38:13,931
This means that, in theory,
596
00:38:14,000 --> 00:38:17,344
as long
as the flight-control system
is in operation...
597
00:38:18,137 --> 00:38:20,931
...the pilot cannot stall
the plane.
598
00:38:21,551 --> 00:38:24,344
Bechet concludes
the flight computers
did override
599
00:38:24,413 --> 00:38:25,965
Captain Asseline's command.
600
00:38:27,620 --> 00:38:29,379
But he believes
that by doing so,
601
00:38:29,448 --> 00:38:33,793
it had prevented the plane
from stalling and crashing
just short of the treeline.
602
00:38:38,275 --> 00:38:41,068
That airplane didn't stall
and...
603
00:38:42,206 --> 00:38:44,896
...let's say landed
on the trees.
604
00:38:46,758 --> 00:38:50,241
The investigation
into the crash at Habsheim
is coming to an end.
605
00:38:52,344 --> 00:38:54,689
Claude Bechet prepares
to deliver his verdict.
606
00:38:56,103 --> 00:38:58,758
The conclusion of my report
was that the airplane
607
00:38:58,827 --> 00:39:01,241
was too low...
608
00:39:01,310 --> 00:39:02,931
too slow,
609
00:39:03,000 --> 00:39:04,827
and was not enough power.
610
00:39:13,310 --> 00:39:15,689
As far as Claude Bechet
is concerned,
611
00:39:15,758 --> 00:39:18,862
the report is the final word
on the Habsheim tragedy.
612
00:39:20,517 --> 00:39:22,931
The case, however,
is far from over.
613
00:39:24,344 --> 00:39:28,241
The French justice system
is moving towards a judgment
of Captain Asseline.
614
00:39:32,241 --> 00:39:34,413
He is charged
with involuntary homicide
615
00:39:34,482 --> 00:39:36,482
in the deaths
of three passengers,
616
00:39:36,551 --> 00:39:39,275
and faces the prospect
of a long prison sentence.
617
00:39:41,862 --> 00:39:45,931
But Captain Asseline believes
he has found evidence
that will exonerate him.
618
00:39:46,620 --> 00:39:51,482
He is convinced
there was a conspiracy to tamper
with the plane's black boxes
619
00:39:51,551 --> 00:39:55,413
to conceal problems
with the A320's
fly-by-wire technology.
620
00:39:57,241 --> 00:40:00,103
There has been a cover-up
with some phony recorders.
621
00:40:01,344 --> 00:40:03,482
That's the first point.
The second point:
622
00:40:03,551 --> 00:40:06,448
They have been changing
the content of the recorders.
623
00:40:07,793 --> 00:40:10,793
It all begins,
according to Asseline,
at the crash site.
624
00:40:12,655 --> 00:40:16,068
An employee of France's
Civil Aviation Authority
is photographed
625
00:40:16,137 --> 00:40:19,241
carrying the A320's
flight recorders from the scene.
626
00:40:21,551 --> 00:40:25,310
Those same black boxes
are presented as evidence
at Asseline's trial.
627
00:40:26,931 --> 00:40:29,379
But inexplicably,
they look different.
628
00:40:31,862 --> 00:40:36,965
I had a chance
to see the black boxes
held by the court,
629
00:40:37,034 --> 00:40:40,103
but when I see the state
they're in, they're old boxes,
630
00:40:40,172 --> 00:40:43,275
full of scratches, dusty,
with chipped paint.
631
00:40:43,344 --> 00:40:46,862
I think: Wait, these can't be
the boxes from the crash;
632
00:40:46,931 --> 00:40:49,482
the plane was new;
they're not the right ones.
633
00:40:53,241 --> 00:40:56,206
Captain Asseline hires
a Swiss criminology institute
634
00:40:56,275 --> 00:40:58,137
to compare the two photographs.
635
00:40:59,206 --> 00:41:02,586
Its conclusion:
They're not the same
flight recorders.
636
00:41:07,275 --> 00:41:10,103
Captain Michel Asseline
claims the black-box data
637
00:41:10,172 --> 00:41:12,517
from his flight
has been tampered with.
638
00:41:12,586 --> 00:41:16,103
But Investigator Claude Bechet
rejects the accusations
as outrageous.
639
00:41:18,068 --> 00:41:20,241
They were trying to...
640
00:41:20,310 --> 00:41:23,068
prove that the tapes...
641
00:41:23,137 --> 00:41:24,862
had been tampered with...
642
00:41:26,068 --> 00:41:27,862
...which we could not
understand,
643
00:41:27,931 --> 00:41:30,137
because every recorder expert...
644
00:41:30,206 --> 00:41:34,689
knew that it was physically
impossible.
645
00:41:36,206 --> 00:41:38,103
But there is one expert
who believes
646
00:41:38,172 --> 00:41:39,931
the black boxes are suspicious.
647
00:41:40,965 --> 00:41:44,241
Ray Davis is a former head
of flight-recorder analysis
648
00:41:44,310 --> 00:41:46,655
at Britain's Air Accidents
Investigation Branch.
649
00:41:49,241 --> 00:41:52,896
He has been hired
by British television to review
the French investigators' work.
650
00:41:54,068 --> 00:41:56,275
It was a bit
of an eye-opener in a way,
651
00:41:56,344 --> 00:41:58,551
in that prior to...
652
00:41:58,620 --> 00:42:00,965
reading the report...
653
00:42:01,758 --> 00:42:04,413
...um, I had
a totally different impression
654
00:42:04,482 --> 00:42:07,793
of the possible causes
of this accident.
655
00:42:07,862 --> 00:42:09,758
Whereas when I read the report,
656
00:42:09,827 --> 00:42:14,620
there were so many anomalies
and questions
raised by the report
657
00:42:14,689 --> 00:42:19,103
that my whole attitude towards
the accident changed completely.
658
00:42:21,655 --> 00:42:24,655
Davis discovers evidence
that could vindicate Asseline.
659
00:42:26,068 --> 00:42:29,172
It raises questions about
when the crew applied power
660
00:42:29,241 --> 00:42:31,344
to try to overfly the trees.
661
00:42:32,793 --> 00:42:35,517
30.
- Takeoff, go-around power!
662
00:42:35,586 --> 00:42:37,275
30.
663
00:42:38,448 --> 00:42:40,931
While studying
the black-box data,
664
00:42:41,000 --> 00:42:43,655
Davis comes across
a curious inconsistency.
665
00:42:45,620 --> 00:42:48,344
French investigators
had synchronized the black boxes
666
00:42:48,413 --> 00:42:51,413
with a transcript
of Air Traffic Control
communications.
667
00:42:53,931 --> 00:42:56,965
Davis examines
the last conversation
the pilots had with the tower
668
00:42:57,034 --> 00:42:58,551
before the crash.
669
00:43:02,344 --> 00:43:06,793
It was recorded
by both Air Traffic Control
and the plane's own black box.
670
00:43:11,620 --> 00:43:15,310
Quebec November Hotel,
Habsheim, Fox Echo 984.
671
00:43:19,689 --> 00:43:23,965
Ray Davis discovers
a time discrepancy
between the two recordings,
672
00:43:24,034 --> 00:43:26,275
amounting to a loss
of several seconds.
673
00:43:29,137 --> 00:43:31,172
According to the black-box data,
674
00:43:31,241 --> 00:43:34,241
the aircraft was five seconds
from impact with the trees
675
00:43:34,310 --> 00:43:37,655
when Captain Asseline commanded
full thrust from the engines.
676
00:43:40,206 --> 00:43:42,758
But according to Ray Davis's
analysis,
677
00:43:42,827 --> 00:43:45,482
this actually took place
four seconds earlier.
678
00:43:47,137 --> 00:43:50,758
This four-second gap
dramatically changes
the calculus of the accident.
679
00:43:50,827 --> 00:43:53,931
It's the difference
between a normal delay
in engine response
680
00:43:54,000 --> 00:43:56,344
and a serious malfunction.
681
00:43:59,827 --> 00:44:03,482
Asseline claims that,
on this particular occasion,
682
00:44:03,551 --> 00:44:06,172
the delay was more
than he expected.
683
00:44:06,241 --> 00:44:07,586
And...
684
00:44:08,275 --> 00:44:12,172
...uh, depending upon which side
of the argument
you come down at,
685
00:44:12,241 --> 00:44:14,172
as to whether or not the, uh,
686
00:44:14,241 --> 00:44:20,034
four-second delay
in the digital flight-data
recording was, uh, real or not,
687
00:44:20,103 --> 00:44:21,965
then, you know, uh...
688
00:44:23,586 --> 00:44:26,413
...he's either an idiot,
or you know,
689
00:44:26,482 --> 00:44:28,241
he's... he's right.
690
00:44:29,172 --> 00:44:31,482
The French justice system
does not believe
691
00:44:31,551 --> 00:44:33,344
that Asseline is right.
692
00:44:34,517 --> 00:44:36,172
After multiple appeals,
693
00:44:36,241 --> 00:44:39,413
Michel Asseline is convicted
of involuntary homicide
694
00:44:39,482 --> 00:44:41,482
and sentenced to 10 months
in prison.
695
00:44:44,620 --> 00:44:46,896
Still, the controversy
over the black boxes
696
00:44:46,965 --> 00:44:49,206
and the missing four seconds
lingers on.
697
00:44:51,586 --> 00:44:55,827
It promises to forever cloud
the results of
Claude Bechet's investigation.
698
00:44:59,034 --> 00:45:02,551
The public opinion thought,
probably: Oh, well...
699
00:45:02,620 --> 00:45:05,689
There was so much at stake,
you know.
700
00:45:05,758 --> 00:45:08,172
It was the future of all...
701
00:45:08,241 --> 00:45:12,172
European aviation industry
702
00:45:12,241 --> 00:45:13,793
which was at stake.
703
00:45:13,862 --> 00:45:17,517
So they managed
to tamper the tapes
704
00:45:17,586 --> 00:45:21,172
so they could blame the pilot
and not the airplane.
705
00:45:22,068 --> 00:45:23,655
But this is just impossible.
706
00:45:24,689 --> 00:45:28,586
The investigation
into the Habsheim accident
made several recommendations.
707
00:45:30,758 --> 00:45:34,275
It calls for passengers
to be banned
on all demonstration flights.
708
00:45:35,758 --> 00:45:39,655
It also calls
for better reconnaissance
of airfields by flight crews.
709
00:45:41,344 --> 00:45:43,758
And they want airline procedures
to be reviewed
710
00:45:43,827 --> 00:45:47,655
to ensure they conform
with official regulations
concerning altitude.
711
00:46:05,551 --> 00:46:09,241
Michel Asseline
went on to a career as a teacher
and inventor
712
00:46:09,310 --> 00:46:10,862
in the aviation industry.
713
00:46:12,482 --> 00:46:15,241
He continues to appeal
his conviction,
714
00:46:15,310 --> 00:46:18,793
and has devoted much of his life
to clearing his name.
715
00:46:20,965 --> 00:46:24,758
The tragedy at Habsheim
would have little impact
on Airbus Industrie.
716
00:46:28,620 --> 00:46:34,000
The A320 would go on to become
one of the most successful
commercial aircraft in history,
717
00:46:34,068 --> 00:46:38,000
selling over 750 planes
in its first 10 years.
718
00:46:39,206 --> 00:46:42,310
And fly-by-wire technology
would be safely adopted
719
00:46:42,379 --> 00:46:45,241
by a new generation
of passenger aircraft.
720
00:47:00,068 --> 00:47:02,137
difuze